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Abstract
The church has played a central role in establishing and maintaining, as well
as undermining, communities throughout modern history. In this paper we
explore some of the mechanisms through which the church can coordinate in-
dividual behavior to achieve improvements in individual and social welfare, and
reveal the ways in which the church can fail, causing established communities
to founder or dissolve. In our model inherently religious individuals may be-
come trapped in a secular equilibrium that is strictly dominated by a religious
equilibrium in which individuals’ actions bestow positive external benefits on
other communitymembers. The church, via its teachings, clergy andministries,
reveals the benefits of coordinated behavior, both in this world and in the world
to come, and the costs of uncoordinated behavior, separation from God and
one’s fellow man, to induce community members to take actions which are
both individually and socially beneficial. External forces, such as the state and
secular society, and internal forces, such as doctrinal disputes, inconsistencies,
and incoherence, can reduce a church’s ability to coordinate, to the detriment
of all.
Keywords: Economics of Religion, Spirituality, Community Formation, Coordination
Failures
JEL classifications: I19
You shall love your neighbor as yourself. There is no com-
mandment greater...
—Mark 12:31
Churches have long played a central role in coordinating community
life. This role is sometimes writ large, such as when the head of an es-
tablished church has key governing duties on a national or international
scale, or small, such as when the rural parish priest sees to the spiritual
and temporal well being of his flock. Since the institutional church is
seldom absent when communities form, grow and die, we examine the
role of churches in community formation and establish a link between
the strength and quality of faith communities and social welfare. We fur-
ther explore the balancing of church and state roles in these processes,
and the costs of community dissolution. We examine these phenom-
ena in a static model of coordination with strategic complementarities.
Using game theoretic techniques we endogenize the interactions among
individuals, adding churches as institutional structures that provide the
spiritual and temporal incentives—coordinating mechanisms—for group
rather than individually oriented actions.
The coordinating role can be played by churches through ethos in
which the individual is to place the community over the self, as can be
seen in key texts like Paul’s letters, the Lord’s Prayer and the fourth cen-
tury Nicene Creed. Churches, concerned with the welfare of their mem-
bers and of the wider community, become guides to individual and com-
munity betterment by providing spiritual subsidies or taxes, implicit or
explicit rewards for investments in one’s own spirituality and in one’s
community, or penalties for failing to do so. Thus, churches which, un-
like present focussed governments, are not prone to time inconsistent
behavior, can enable their members to internalize the external effects of
their actions on other members, both in their faith community and soci-
ety at large, and thereby induce better outcomes with higher wellbeing
for all community members. But, if churches or the leaders thereof fail to
live what they preach, or if their role is delegated to or crowded out by the
state or the market, their ability to coordinate and sustain communities
will diminish and society as a whole may suffer.
1 The Church and the Community
The major monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are
all community religions. Members of these faith communities come to-
gether to worship and are bound to each other by ties of spiritual kin-
ship. Thus, to achieve their basic communitarian goals, institutional
structures—the congregation, the parish, the world Church, the universal
Church—have been developed. It is these structures, their reflection in
the Christian Scriptures, the incentives used to maintain them, and their
potential weaknesses that we first describe.
1.1 Importance of Community—In Scripture
The centrality of community and of communal interaction and the origins
for the institutions to facilitate them can be seen in the New Testament
(NT). Christian Scriptures provide a key set of models andmotivations for
Christians as they relate with each other and form communities. While
we examine most closely Christian Scripture, similar dynamics operate
in the Jewish and Islamic Scriptures.
The core of the call to community can be found in the scriptural ex-
hortation to love your neighbor for this imposes amode of behavior on all
believers to treat others well (Mark 12:31). Who one’s neighbors are, and
thus what the limits of one’s community are, is not defined narrowly by
faith or ethnicity (Luke 10:25–29). Further, the individual cannot choose
not to respond to another’s need because, by definition, that need is now
his as well. This does not make community a meaningless construct by
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including everyone, but it does suggest that one cannot turn one’s back
on those in need just because they are not of one’s community narrowly
defined.
But the call to community brings obligations—both for the wealthy
and for one’s peers. The rich are called, first of all to see the “poor
at their gate” (Luke 16:26). From a Gospel perspective, ignoring others’
needs given one’s relative wealth is both an offence against one’s com-
munity and an offense against God, since according to scripture wealth is
a gift of God which should be used to benefit the community as a whole
(Scott, 1990, p. 137). The demand to compassion and action is not lim-
ited to the wealthy. The Book of Acts reflects the communitarian ideal
put before the early Christians to share all resources for the betterment
of the community (Acts 4:32).
Bartchy (2002) suggests that Luke presents God as a “community-
forming and community sustaining power” (p. 91). This community of
believers brought together by God, which is reflected in the early chapters
of Acts, is one’s surrogate family, and it is this family’s welfare, rather
than one’s own or one’s own kinship group’s welfare, that is of the ut-
most importance. And all contribute; each caring for the others, all being
essential to the whole. In this way the idea of community and the implicit
and explicit admonition to put community before self is institutionalized.
The unity of the early communities is constantly under threat. Paul’s
First Letter to the Corinthians is occasioned by divisions and factions
among the nascent Christian community. His vision for them and that to
which he calls them is a unity in mutual service, especially in the service
of the financially and socially most disadvantaged among them.
Paul emphasizes that more can be achieved and all can bemade better
off, both in the here and now and eschatologically, by working together
and caring for each other. In fact, to achieve what is possible requires
that all work together, that gifts be shared (1 Cor 12).
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But, Christ asks more than that by placing demands on those most
able and most gifted to give more, to serve their communities. Knowing
human nature and the strength of the desire to succeed in this life, suc-
cess is redefined. Spiritual wealth, through service to God and commu-
nity, given its value both in this life and the next, trump material wealth
with value only in the here and now. That is, in its earliest manifesta-
tions, the Christian church placed the welfare of the community over the
welfare of each individual member thereof.
1.2 Community formation during the Patristic period
During the first few centuries of the Common Era the Christian church es-
tablished itself as an institution rather than a set of largely independent
Pauline congregations which were often under stress from both within,
see 1 Cor, and without. The reality of community required more struc-
ture than that outlined in the Scriptures. For example, baptism, the ini-
tiation in the Christian community, symbolizing a “passage from one
population to another ... a new form of identity,” (Johnson 1998, p. 77)
was supposed to bring the earliest Christians to the ultimate mystery of
Christ. Yet, they sought further initiations into higher mysteries, a be-
lief pattern consistent with their pagan religious experience. To survive
and to further its communitarian goals the church had to adapt (John-
son, 1998). Persecution of Christian communities throughout the Roman
Empire revealed the importance of “maintaining ecclesiastical unity, pas-
toral integrity, and consistent standards of membership” (Hayes, 2002, p.
155). This required leaders and a consistent, respected leadership struc-
ture, but little in the Gospels, or in Acts, or in Paul’s letters suggested
how leaders would be chosen, or the extent of their power beyond their
own congregation. The church as a universal institution did not yet exist.
Leaders, the bishops of the early church, were required to guide the com-
munities (Young, 2002), where the bishop was God’s representative on
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earth. As the community grew, the need to maintain it, that is, to coordi-
nate the activities of members to the common good, led to the ordination
of priests and the hierarchical institutional structure of the church, both
of which conferred authority and provided a leadership (coordinating)
structure.
1.3 The church in community formation/urbanization
At the end of the Patristic period (late antiquity), the Roman Empire was
collapsing, and the security of individuals in society was constantly under
threat. The social structure imposed by the Empire was slowly breaking
down and it was, as Peter Brown (1981) suggests, the church that offered
its current members and the pagans it wished to evangelize a community
structure, an extended family, but one not based on kinship—while the
church provided an ordered society for the living.
Katherine Lynch (2003) argues forcefully that the medieval Church,
like the early Church, provided the intellectual foundation and organiza-
tional model for community life. Cities of the medieval and early modern
period were characterized by highmortality, large numbers of temporary
and permanent migrants, small families, and many single people. There
were very limited social possibilities (Knuth 1992). While, at one level
Church structures resisted the development of new forms of religious
life (Peters 1991), at another there emerged from the life of the Church
models for support networks and the framework upon which commu-
nities were built. Community bonds were formed between the believ-
ers who made up the Church. Voluntary kinship relationships, such as
godparenthood, could be created. This pseudo kinship relationship, ex-
ceptionally important in times of high mortality, was a spiritual rather
than a blood relationship, and as such it carried no right of inheritance.
Rather it was built on mutual assistance and gift—voluntary ties that
bind—rather than strategic considerations—cooperation and communi-
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tarian objectives were institutionalized.
When kinship ties of family or marriage were absent, single individ-
uals, especially women, were still able to create surrogate families by
the formation of residential communities. These communities of single
lay women, were patterned after, and often associated with, monasteries.
However, in contrast to female religious (e.g., nuns), these residents were
not required to be cloistered. These women, known as beguines, were re-
ligiously observant, were dedicated to the ideals of chastity and charity,
but worked in the market to support themselves rather than relying on
the charity of others or their families to support them. These beguinages
were voluntary associationswhere individuals joined together for the bet-
terment of all within their own community, that the individual beguines
were concerned with the welfare of those in the broader community, and
that they were associated with and patterned after religious orders: the
institutions of the church were emulated by secular society.
Still looser ties, but important nonetheless, were forged by member-
ship in confraternal societies. These societies, often open to both men
and women, married and single, were nonresidential religious organi-
zations built on the premise of the importance of a community based
devotional life, of mutual assistance in time of need, and of charity to
those less fortunate in society. This charity was directly given by society
members to the poor. Communal links were forged via direct contact.
They provided support networks and requirements of aid and assistance
not hampered by ties of kinship (and thus of inheritance). While they
were lay organizations, a member of the clergy would generally act as
chaplain and moral guide. The sharp divisions between the sacred and
the secular did not yet exist, but a stable communitarian model had been
developed in which the church played a central coordinating role.
de Swaan (1988) contends that parish communities as well as urban
centers could not have formed without a system of poor relief, and it
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was the clergy who organized and facilitated that relief. To establish a
viable system it was necessary to ensure that all involved played their
parts—that is, there were no free-riders either among those giving the
charity or those receiving the charity. This required a mutually agreed
set of rules (a commonly agreed social welfare function), trust that if
you played by the rules you would receive your reward, oversight and
persuasion to preclude free riders and other forms of cheating. Ensuring
that these requirements were met fell to the clergy. Those providing
the charity did so for reasons both practical—personal and economic
security—and spiritual—since they would be prayed for by the recipients
of their largesse. Moreover, being charitable was a duty and obligation of
all Christians who would be rewarded in the next life if not in this. To the
extent that charity was a public activity, and it was since those who gave
wanted to be sure that their generosity was recognized and rewarded, it
was capable of being monitored. Thus, social control could be exerted.
As countries developed, the universal power and wealth of the church
diminished or became fractured, and cities grew, civic duty replaced reli-
gious charity as the source of poor relief. Compulsion (taxation) replaced
voluntary (if incentivized) cooperation. And, while material wealth has
clearly increased over the two centuries or so of state domination of poor
relief, community cohesion has weakened.
1.4 Challenges to church led community formation today
Today the role of the Christian church has moved from the center to
the periphery (Hester, 2002), making it harder for it to fulfill its pastoral
(coordinating) role even narrowly for its own community. What appears
to be required for success is high market density, a large enough com-
munity of faith, which leads to higher participation and better economic
outcomes (Gruber, 2005). Although challenged to sustain themselves in
a changing environment (Webster, 2002; Hester, 2002; Volf, 2002), faith
7
communities maintain their concern and commitment to the broader,
multicultural and multifaith community of which they are a part. When
faith communities seek to help build a sustainable multicultural com-
munity they are often actively excluded by statutory agencies and sec-
ular funding agencies when they apply for outside funding for commu-
nity regeneration and renewal projects (Smith, 2002). Perhaps this is
because they have been ignored or disdained by theorists of multicul-
turalism whose perspective is decidedly secular and at least implicitly
anti-religious (Modood, 1999). This is true even though many who are
members of this multicultural community, and are the disadvantaged
and socially excluded, identify themselves first by their religious affili-
ation (Farnell, 2001). Yet it remains that, although often marginalized,
“religious communities maintain a role as a forum for social interaction,
mutual support and personal networking” (Smith, 2002, p. 168): they
can provide the coordinating mechanism.
While churches are, grudgingly, recognized as useful and perhaps
even a necessary component of community revitalization, they are also
acknowledged as essential for the maintenance of civil society in modern
Western democracies. This is because “egalitarianism in a commercial re-
public such as the United States unleashes a materialistic quest. At this
juncture, faith communities, not simply as a goad and a kind of adjunct
feature of the civic but, rather, in their robust specificity and particular-
ity, are vital. Why? Because such traditions and communal institutions
serve as a chastening influence on striving ambition by inspiring contrary
urges that draw people into community and away from narrow material-
ism. Religion, in Toqueville’s words, helps to ‘purify, control, and restrain
that excessive and exclusive taste for well-being human beings acquire in
an age of equality.’ Tocqueville surely had in his sights the early covenan-
tal tradition and its living remnants. The notion of covenant is one that
stresses mutual accountability of persons to one another and before God.
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This creates and sustains ‘a kind of moral equality among people’ (Elsh-
tain, 2001, pp. 44–45). Peter Drucker (Forbes, 1998) echoes Tocqueville
by stating that the pastoral church is the most important social move-
ment of our time because it provides community, a sense of belonging,
gives meaning to one’s life, and pastoral care for those in need.
2 A Model of Church and Community
In order to understand and appreciate the potential and actual role of the
church in community, we develop a model similar to Cooper’s (1999) ba-
sic model of coordination failure games, with an institutional emphasis
similar to Bowles (2004). In these games individual agent’s choices affect
the payoffs to other agents’ choices, but this external effect is not priced
by the market. As a result, agents may make choices that are individ-
ually rational, but result in a Pareto inferior equilibrium outcome. The
problem is that without a functioning market they may be unable to co-
ordinate their choices. But, because of the nature of the interrelationship
among payoffs, a market will not open, which leaves “sunspots” or “an-
imal spirits” (see Weil, 1989) or an institution, such as the government,
or in our case the church, to play the coordinating role.
Inmanymacroeconomic applications of the coordination failuremodel,
the role played by the government is as often stabilizing, (e.g., Diamond
and Dybvig, 1983), as it is—perhaps inadvertently — destabilizing, (see
Kydland and Prescott, 1977, or Barro and Gordon, 1983). The problem
is that the government must be able to commit itself to taking specific
actions (and thus to be able to commit future governments as well as the
current government to taking these actions) without having the mech-
anism to do so. Churches, however, have two channels through which
they can achieve coordination. First, through their foundational teaching
(scripture and doctrine), which provides a commitment mechanism and
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assesses implicit spiritual penalties and rewards. And second, through
their clergy, who have close relationships with the members of their con-
gregations and who communicate the church’s commitment, the cost of
the penalties and the benefits of the rewards, who, thus, facilitate or even
achieve coordination both in the here and now as well as eschatologically.
Our model also bears a close kinship to Hollander’s (1990) model of
social exchange and the Brekke et al. (2003) model of moral motivation.
These papers ask why individuals take actions that are socially, if not
what is thought to be individually, optimal. Hollander suggests it is be-
cause we seek the approval of our fellows. Brekke et al., suggest that it is
because we, as individuals, want to maintain our self-image as socially re-
sponsible individuals, and define the socially responsible ideal via Kant’s
Categorical Imperative. We take a step further back and ask what the
foundations of these moral motivations are, and find them both in the
ideal of community, consistent with Kant, but also in man’s seeking for
divine in addition to human approbation, a situation in which the reward
for moral behavior may not come in this life (Bonhoeffer, 1959).
Finally, ourmodel also shares some featureswith Tirole’s (1996)model
of collective reputation. Here the collective reputation ismediated through
the moral authority of the church and behavioral norms held to by the
believers following the tenets of their faith. Collapse of this moral au-
thority, like a reputation squandered, cannot be easily reversed, so com-
munities fracture just as a firm loses market share.
2.1 The Individual
Consider a society in which there are n+ 1 agents who have a potential
joint religious affiliation.1 Each agent i = {1,2, . . . , n+ 1} has individual
preferences defined over leisure time, l, material goods, m, and their
1In this paper we assume a single church. In future work we will look at multiple
churches which may positively or negatively interact.
10
spirituality, σ , given by
u(l,m,σ) = (l− λ)α(m− µ)βσ,
where
σ
(
r ,d
∣∣∣h) = h(1+ r)γT (1+ d)γM .
The agent’s spirituality is defined over time spent in religious observance
and other church related activities, such as volunteering at a church spon-
sored charity, r , and donations made to one’s church relative to one’s
income, d.2 The multiplier h, discussed in greater detail below, denotes
potential spiritual rewards and penalties that stem directly from theo-
logical concerns and indirectly from one’s choices.
The amount of time spent in leisure activities that is considered “so-
cially necessary” is denoted by λ; and µ is the “socially necessary” amount
of material consumption. Socially necessary time-use and material con-
sumption are the outcome of socio-cultural imperatives, such as keeping
up with the Joneses, both in terms of goods consumed and activities
attended.3
The constraints faced by the agent are:
Time: T ≡ 1 = l+ r (with λ < T ) (1)
Money: M = pm+ d (with µ < M)
 d = M − pm
M
, or m = M
p
(
1− d
)
, (2)
where p is the price of material goods.
2This normalization of donations follows from Mark 12:41–44 in which the poor
widow’s generosity is contrasted with the relative miserliness of the crowd.
3That individuals gauge their happiness not by what they have, per se, but rather by
how what they have compares with what their peers have has been found by Blanch-
flower and Oswald (2004) among others. We represent the comparison consumption
and leisure activities as social norms.
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The parameter restrictions are:
α,β, γT , γM > 0
α+ β ≤ 1.
Thus, the benefit to consumption of material goods and leisure diminish
at the margin, but this need not be the case for one’s spirituality.
2.2 The Church
Let χ(R,D,ρ) denote the institutional strength of the agent’s church or
congregation and index the agent whenever needed by i. Here
• R := ∑j≠i rj is the amount of time devoted by the agent’s fellow
religious community members;
• D := ∑j≠i dj + dS are the financial resources available to the con-
gregation independently of the agent’s contributions, where dS are
funds from other sources, such as the state. Finally,
• ρ measures theological factors affecting the institutional strength
of the church, e.g., foundational teachings of the church and church
leadership (at all levels of the Church hierarchy).
We assume that χ is increasing at a decreasing rate in all three of its
arguments. Specifically, we let
χ(R,D,ρ) = Rκ1Dκ2ρκ3 , (3)
with κk > 0, ∀k = 1,2,3, and
∑
k
κk = 1.
Thus, a church that lacks a coherent belief system or has ineffective lead-
ers (ρ = 0), or in which none of its members devotes any time to religious
practice (R = 0), or which is devoid of resources (D = 0), also has no in-
stitutional strength.
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Notice, institutional strength has both a temporal and a spiritual di-
mension, and it is through this spiritual dimension—which links actions
today with eschatological rewards or punishments— that the church pro-
vides spiritual incentives for individually and community oriented good
behavior.
2.3 The Church & The Individual
A relationship between the church and the individual is provided through
the individuals’ spirituality function, σ , and potential spiritual penalties,
h. Thus, the institutional strength of the church has a positive effect on
the agent’s benefit from religious activity, both in terms of time spent in
religious pursuits and in terms of resources devoted to religion. This is
formalized in the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The church strengthens the individual’s spirituality by in-
creasing the agent’s marginal utility from time spent in religious pursuits
and from charitable giving. Thus, for S = T ,M let γS = γS(χ) be contin-
uous and twice differentiable, with
γS(0) ≥ 0, limχ→∞γS(χ) = ∞ and
γ′S > 0, γ
′′
S ≤ 0 ∀χ > 0; S = T ,M.
Given this assumption, we study the indirect effect that the church
has on leisure time and material consumption, given that it directly af-
fects time spent in religious pursuits and charitable giving.
Consider now the multiplier h. For a large set of agent choices, we
consider h to be a constant multiplier (which can be normalized to 1).
However, we also include the possibility that an individual can be as-
sessed a “spiritual penalty” in circumstances in which adherence to min-
imal religious covenants is violated. If these can be represented by a
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minimum of religious activity, rmin(ρ), or charitable giving, dmin(ρ), one
can think of h as an indicator function,
h
(
r ,d
)
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
h ≡ 1 if r ≥ rmin(ρ)∧ d ≥ dmin(ρ),
h < h if r < rmin(ρ)∨ d < dmin(ρ).
Here h may be equal to 0, or even negative, e.g., h = −1. Indeed, if one
were to include realizations of h in the after-life, one might also consider
h = +∞ or h = −∞.
See, for example, Matt 5:22, Mark 9:43, Luke 3:9, or Rev 21:8, where
behavioral incentives are specified. That is, according to the Catholic cat-
echism, “the chief punishment of hell is eternal separation from God, in
whom alone man can possess the life and happiness for which he was
created and for which he longs” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, para-
graph 1035). These penalties represent behavioral inducements which
define minimally acceptable behavior of an individual vis-a`-vis God and
as a member of the community of men. The minima depend on church
teachings, ρ, and may differ from church to church.
3 The agent’s time allocation problem
Given the model of church and community, consider now how an agent
acts within the community and how this affects himself and others.
For now we consider only cases in which h = 1 or, equivalently, cases
in which the agent’s decisions are not affected by the presence of the h
multiplier. Let v(M) denote the agent’s utility associated with income
M when it is optimally allocated between material consumptionm∗ and
religious contributions d
∗
, i.e.,
v(M) :=
u
(
l,m∗, σ
(
r ,d
∗))
(l− λ)α(1+ r)γT .
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Then the agent’s time-allocation problem is given by
v(M)(l− λ)α(1+ r)γT →max
{l,r}
! s.t. l+ r = 1 and l, r ≥ 0
 v(M)(1− r − λ)α(1+ r)γT →max
{r}
! s.t. r ∈ [0,1]
The first order conditions of the modified objective are:
−αv(M)(1− r − λ)α−1(1+ r)γT + γTv(M)(1− r − λ)α(1+ r)γT−1
= −α(1+ r)+ γT (1− r − λ) ≤ 0
and r ≥ 0,
with at least one of the two inequalities holding with equality. So, using
br as a mnemonic for “best response,” the agent’s optimally chosen time
spent in religious pursuits is given by
rbr =max
{
0,
γT (1− λ)−α
α+ γT
}
. (4)
Given Assumption 1, we would like to ascertain when agents obtain
an equilibrium in which they are religiously observant, and how such
an equilibrium is affected by parameter values, including such factors
as church teachings. However, we do not preclude the possibility that,
despite agents valuing their spirituality, there are outcomes in society
in which there is no religious activity. That is, we assume that absent a
functioning church (i.e., χ = 0), individuals’ marginal utility from leisure
exceeds that from religious activity. Formally,
Assumption 2 Absent a functioning church, the marginal rate of substi-
tution between religious activities and leisure is less than one, i.e.,
∂u/∂r
∂u/∂l
∣∣∣∣
χ=0
< 1.
An implication of Assumption 2 is that absent a functioning church,
i.e., whenever χ = 0, the individual will choose not to spend time in
religious activity despite being religious. Formally,
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Lemma 1 (Potential for Coordination Failure) Although agents are spiri-
tual (γT > 0), an implication of Assumption 2 in conjunction with Equation
(??) is that there always trivially exist equilibrium configurations in which
there is no religious activity.
While we do care about circumstances that can lead to such equilib-
rium outcomes, we are not primarily interested in trivial coordination
failure outcomes. It is therefore important to determine under what cir-
cumstances an equilibrium without religious activity is the unique out-
come, rather than simply a coordination failure outcome.
3.1 Secular and Religious Equilibrium
Taking h = 1 as given, it can be shown that even when R,D,ρ > 0, yield-
ing χ > 0 so that the church is potentially viable, an agent may be best
off without any religious participation (which, by symmetry, is then true
for all agents). In technical terms, an equilibrium in which no-one partic-
ipates in religious activity is remarkably stable. Thus, even (the potential
for) religious dedication and (the potential for) financial dedication to
one’s religious community is not sufficient to support societal outcomes
with active religious participation, whenever church moral authority is
weak as a result of inconsistencies, incoherence, discontinuities, etc. in
church teachings or due to failures in church leadership.
Proposition 1 (Unique Secular Equilibrium) Given finite time and fi-
nite financial resources of a (potential) congregation, an equilibrium in
which agents sustain religious participation does not exist if the church
does not have sufficient moral authority, i.e.,
∀R,D <∞ ∃ρ > 0 s.t. ∀ρ < ρ nrbri < R.
Thomas Hobbes in his philosophical treatise Leviathan described hu-
mans as innately religious, and suggested that religion providesmenwith
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behavioral norms that ensure a civil society in which both earthly and
divine laws are promulgated and followed. But, since the authority of
religion, the church, depends on those who lead it, that authority can
be undermined by those leaders behaving in ways contrary to their own
teachings. To Hobbes this explained the expulsion of the Roman Catholic
Church from England, but also the downfall of those leading the Refor-
mation. Without the authority of the church, man falls into a state of
“war” with each individual seeking his own end without concern for oth-
ers. This state describes both our trivial and our secular coordination
failure equilibria. While life in these equilibria will not be “solitary, nasty,
brutish, and short,” (Hobbes, 1958 [1651], p. 107), they will bring individ-
uals less happiness (personal fulfilment) than the religious equilibrium.
Nevertheless, while a secular equilibrium always exists, when the church
becomes stronger, there also exists a religious equilibrium.
Corollary 1 (Religious Equilibrium) A symmetric equilibrium with a
high level of religious activity exists whenever ρ ≥ ρ. Moreover, whenever
ρ > ρ, there exist two symmetric Pareto-rankable religious equilibrium
outcomes. The Pareto dominant one entails a higher level of religious
activity and is stable, whereas the inferior one is not stable. In both cases,
religious activity is (non-uniquely) implied by
0 < reqi = req =
γT
(
(nreq)κ1 Dκ2ρκ3
)
(1− λ)−α
α+ γT
(
(nreq)κ1 Dκ2ρκ3
) , ∀i.
An informal proof and the intuition behind the equilibrium is dis-
cussed in the next subsection. Note first, however, that analogous Propo-
sitions and Corollaries exist that demonstrate the need (and potential
sufficiency) of a minimum of religious devotion by the congregation and
concerning a minimum of financial resources available in order to sup-
port a religious equilibrium. In other words, religious observation (in this
model) is inherently a group activity—even if we model the rewards as
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individualistic. Thus, even significant moral authority built on the foun-
dational teachings of the church and the quality of its leadership need
not be sufficient for an individual to reap the benefits of religious activity
(so that in response rbri = 0) independent of the financial resources of
the church.
In this model, unlike most models of moral behavior or altruism (see
Laffont 1975, Hollander, 1990, Andreoni, 1990, and Brekke et al. 2003),
the public good is the community, and, as such, intangible. While agents
concerned with their spiritual growth give of what they have been given,
they do not do so to enrich or strengthen the church. However, by liv-
ing their faith they do strengthen the institution which, in turn, further
strengthens their faith.
3.2 Discussion of the Religious Equilibrium and its Attainment
Before characterizing and studying the religious equilibrium in detail,
we first show how its attainment depends on how one agent’s actions
are direct responses to the actions of other members in the community,
and how—in turn—the individual’s actions affect the overall community.
Let ρ > ρ be given, so that the church provides a sufficiently strong
foundation to allow for a religious equilibrium given the resource and
time constraints of the community. We assume that all members of the
community—save the individual whose optimal responses we wish to
analyze—chose the same level of religious activity. We then seek to de-
termine how the individual responds to this level.
From the agent’s first order condition (Equation ??) in conjunction
with Assumptions 1 and 2, we know that when the remaining members
of the community have religious participation levels that are too low,
the agent will not devote any time to religious activities. However (by
virtue of the existence of a religious equilibrium) there exists a threshold
religious activity level in the community, call this R˜, so that the agent is
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on the verge of participating in religious activity (see Figure 1). Formally,
γT
(
R˜κ1Dκ2ρκ3
)
(1−λ) = α. For this level, let r˜−i denote the (symmetric)
religious activity of members of the community other than the individual
i associated with R˜, that is, r˜−i := R˜/n. Then the agent’s first order
condition (Equation ??) is
rbri =
γT ((nr˜−i)κ1Dκ2ρκ3) (1− λ)−α
α+ γT ((nr˜−i)κ1Dκ2ρκ3) ≡ 0.
Thus, despite others being involved in religious activity, the individual
does not find it worth his while to take part. However, it is also clear that
this choice is in response to what the other members of the community
chose to do. Hence, consider now how the individual optimally responds
to a change in the others’ actions. Specifically, the right-derivative is,
(
d
dr−i
)+
rbri (r−i) =
γ′Tκ1χα(2− λ)
r−i (α+ γT )2
> 0. (5)
That is, one’s own desired religious activity level rbri increases with the
overall level of religious activity in the community. This insight is impor-
tant in its own right:
Lemma 2 (Multiplier Effects) An agent’s optimal choice of religious ob-
servance, rbri is increasing in others’ religious activities. That is,
d
dr−i
rbri (r−i) ≥ 0.
At levels of R = nr−i at which the agent begins to actively participate
in religious activity, the derivative in Lemma 2 is in fact greater than
one. Thus, a uniform symmetric increase in religious activity by other
members in the community, r−i, by one unit of time (e.g., an hour per
week), leads to an optimal response of the individual that is greater than
one unit of time, e.g., the agent responds by spending more than an hour
at religious activities, albeit, still less than the other members of the
community do.
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Thus, the agent’s religious participation increases more quickly than
that of the other members in the community, leading to a convergence
in activities. Indeed, at some point all agents in society spend the same
amount of time in religious activities, call this level rˆi = rˆ−i = rˆ (see
Figure 1).
Once this level of religious activity is reached, an equilibrium is at-
tained. That is, since rˆi is the optimal individual religious activity level
(i.e., the best response) when others are at the same level, society’s ac-
tions are not only individually optimal, but also mutually consistent. For-
mally, the condition of religious equilibrium given in Corollary ?? is met
at rˆ , i.e.,
rˆ = γT
(
(nrˆ)κ1 Dκ2ρκ3
)
(1− λ)−α
α+ γT
(
(nrˆ)κ1 Dκ2ρκ3
) .
However, this equilibrium is not considered “stable” in the following
sense. Because the slope (derivative) of an agent’s best response is still
greater than unity at this point, if the other members each contribute
another hour to religious activity, the individual best responds by in-
creasing his activity by more than an hour—which, in turn, leads to the
others optimally further increasing the amount of time they spend in
religious activity.4 Such propagation slows once the derivative of the
best-response function is less than one. However, it does not come to an
end until society’s actions are again individually optimal and mutually
consistent—i.e., a new equilibrium is reached, call this equilibrium level
of religious activity r∗i = r∗−i = r∗ (see Figure 1), again with,
r∗ = γT
(
(nr∗)κ1 Dκ2ρκ3
)
(1− λ)−α
α+ γT
(
(nr∗)κ1 Dκ2ρκ3
) . (6)
This equilibrium is stable, in the sense that individual deviations lead
only tominor responses of others, that are weak enough tomake it worth-
while for the deviator to return to the original equilibrium. This stable
4Conversely, if any agent spends less than rˆ in religious activity, all others best
respond by reducing their activity levels, and as this is self-perpetuating, society col-
lapses back onto the secular equilibrium given in Proposition ??.
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equilibrium is the equilibrium we will henceforth refer to when speaking
of the “religious equilibrium.”
3.3 Properties of the Religious Equilibrium
In light of the preceding discussion, the critical importance of the inter-
relationship between members of the community is clear. Indeed, attain-
ment of a religious equilibrium is not possible without others to interact
with. This has an implication for the quality of the religious equilibrium,
as well as individual members’ actions, spirituality and wellbeing.
Proposition 2 In the religious equilibrium, an increase in church mem-
bership yields higher religious participation by individual members and
results in higher levels of spirituality and over-all wellbeing. That is,
d
dn
r∗ > 0;
d
dn
σ > 0;
d
dn
u > 0.
Note that this and the following results are in part represented by an
increase in the rbri (r−i) function in Figure 1.
Christianity is an evangelical religion, and, as such, Christians by their
example of living the Gospels, loving their neighbors as themselves, are
supposed to convert others to their beliefs. In our model, that trans-
lates into increasing n. An increase in the size of the religious com-
munity increases each individual member’s spirituality by increasing the
strength of the faith community and thereby the institutional strength of
the church. All, new and old members of the community alike, are made
better off.5 This improved spiritual and temporal welfare is, in essence,
what Pope Benedict is suggesting when he speaks of returning God to the
public consciousness and to the center of European culture (Ratzinger,
2005) and of re-evangelizing Europe (Thavis, 2005); what the Anglican
5Our result is consistent with Lipford (1995) who finds that an increase in the size
of a congregation does not induce free riding.
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Communion dedicated its Decade of Evangelism to (Carey, 1999), and
the center of the vision proclamation of the Assemblies of God (General
Council of the AoG, 2000).
Note that thus far the role of church doctrine, i.e., ρ has been discussed
as a minimum (necessary, but not sufficient) requirement to obtain the
religious equilibrium. However, even when ρ > ρ so that a religious
equilibrium is attainable (and attained), church teachings and leadership
quality play important roles in the characterization and the “quality” of
that equilibrium. Thus,
Proposition 3 In the religious equilibrium, a strengthening of church
doctrine and improving the quality of church leadership yields higher reli-
gious participation by members and results in higher levels of spirituality
and over-all wellbeing. That is,
d
dρ
r∗ > 0;
d
dρ
σ > 0;
d
dρ
u > 0.
The strength and moral authority of a church, which is essential for
its ability to coordinate behavior, can be affected by a wide variety of
things including conscious decisions to revise foundational beliefs taken
by church leaders, behavior of church leaders in ways inconsistent with
the received teachings of the church, or changes in society that lead to
changes in how church teachings are perceived. Whatever the source of
the strength or the cause of its change, churches with stronger more co-
herent theologies attract adherents, and those with weaker less coherent
theologies lose adherents. Thus, the decline in attendance at and mem-
bership in Christian churches of all denominations throughout Europe
can be explained by church teachings being perceived as less compelling
than a secularist alternative, the decline in attendance at mainline Protes-
tant churches in the United States can be explained by fundamental dis-
agreements on church doctrine, for example the schism caused by the
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election of an openly gay Bishop by the U.S. Episcopal Church and the
blessing of same sex marriages by the Canadian Anglican Church in con-
travention of Anglican Communion doctrine (Blair, 2005), and the decline
in attendance at the Roman Catholic Church in the United States and Ire-
land as a result of the pedophilia scandals which exposed the church
hierarchy’s protection of guilty priests rather than of innocent children
(John Jay College of Law, 2005 ; Murphy, et al., 2005).
In addition to church membership and teachings, the resources of the
church are also critical in effecting its mission and thus the activities
and wellbeing of its members:
Proposition 4 In the religious equilibrium, an increase in the financial
resources available to the church yields higher religious participation by
members and results in higher levels of spirituality and over-all wellbeing.
That is,
d
dD
r∗ > 0;
d
dD
σ > 0;
d
dD
u > 0.
The wealth of one’s congregation or church allows it to carry out its
ministry of charity to those in need, whether members of the congrega-
tion or not. This, as established in the work of Lynch (2003) and de Swaan
(1988), strengthens and stabilizes communities, and thereby makes com-
munity members better off. These same communities can be weakened,
and the wellbeing of their members reduced, by decreases in the tem-
poral wealth of the church as a result, for example, of income taxation
which reduces individuals after tax income and thus their ability to give.
This weakening and the effects thereof are the case even if the tax rev-
enues are used to provide the same charitable services as were previously
provided by the church. de Swaan (1988) suggests that the differential ef-
fect arises because of how the funds are provided—if by taxation they are
compulsory, while if by donations to the church they are voluntary, and
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because of the distancing of those providing the charitable sources (tax-
payers, rather than members of the church) from those receiving them
(the poor, rather than members of the church).
Lastly, we consider how secular society affects individual religiosity, spir-
ituality, and overall wellbeing.
Proposition 5 In the religious equilibrium, an increase in the socially
minimal ‘requirements’ on time spent at leisurely activities yields dimin-
ished religious participation by members and results in lower levels of
spirituality and overall wellbeing. That is,
d
dλ
r∗ < 0;
d
dλ
σ < 0;
d
dλ
u < 0.
The difficulties inherent in turning away from this world and the de-
mands thereof and toward God have been recognized since Biblical times.
See Luke 14: 16–24, where the demands of the world, the activities one
engages in to meet and surpass a socio-cultural expectation, also take
one away from religious activities. This leads, ultimately, to less rather
than greater happiness, since all community members will respond sim-
ilarly to the worldly demands by reducing religious participation, and
then reducing it further in response to the lower level of participation
by their peers. This is the important implication of the multiplier effects
described in Lemma 2.
4 The agent’s money allocation problem
Having analyzed the agent’s time allocation problem, consider now how
money is allocated between competing desires. Again, we consider only
cases in which h = 1 or, equivalently, cases in which the agent’s de-
cisions are not affected by the presence of the h multiplier. Let v(T)
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denote the agent’s utility associated with time T when it is optimally al-
located between leisure l∗ and religious activities r∗. Then, analogously
to the time allocation problem, one obtains the agent’s money allocation
problem and solution,
v(T)
(
M
p
(
1− d
)
− µ
)β (
1+ d
)γM
→max{
d
} ! s.t. d ∈ [0,1];
⇒ dbr =max
⎧⎨
⎩0,
γM
(
1− pMµ
)
− β
β+ γM
⎫⎬
⎭ . (7)
The solution in Equation ?? resembles that of the time allocation problem
given in Equation ??. Notice, however, that the marginal utility from
material consumption, µ, is now weighted by (the inverse of) the real
value of monetary income.
Similar to Assumption 2, absent a functioning church (i.e., χ = 0)
marginal utility from material consumption exceeds that of charitable
giving. Formally,
Assumption 3 Absent a functioning church, the marginal rate of substi-
tution between charitable giving/donations and material consumption is
less than one’s real income, i.e.,
∂u/∂d
∂u/∂m
∣∣∣∣∣
χ=0
<
M
p
.
Given this structure, the analysis of equilibrium is analogous to that
of time allocation, with the Pareto-superior religious equilibrium being
characterized by,
d
∗ =
γM
(
Rκ1
(
nMd
∗)κ2
ρκ3
)(
1− pMµ
)
− β
β+ γM
(
Rκ1
(
nMd
∗)κ2
ρκ3
) . (8)
Moreover, all of the results derived for the individual and for the
community concerning religious activity carry over mutatis mutandis for
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the equilibrium with charitable giving. Of the analogous results, the one
most noteworthy is that concerning (perceived or actual) pressures put
on the individual by secular society. That is, the parallel to Proposition
??:
Proposition 6 In the religious equilibrium, an increase in the socially
minimal ‘requirements’ on material consumption yields diminished reli-
gious donations by members and results in lower levels of spirituality and
overall wellbeing. That is,
d
dµ
r∗ < 0;
d
dµ
σ < 0;
d
dµ
u < 0.
The difficulties faced by the rich in getting into heaven are found
throughout the synoptic Gospels, as is evident from Mark 10: 23–25,
Matt 13: 18–23, Luke 6: 24, or Luke 18: 18–24. They all suggest that the
pull of the comforts of this life, more available to the rich than the poor,
are a distraction from dedicating oneself and one’s wealth to achieving
the riches of the next life. But this accumulation of goods also fails to
provide happiness in this life. In the middle ages the problem of riches
was recast in terms of greed or avarice. The problem here was not wealth
in and of itself, but an excess of wealth not shared with those less for-
tunate (Newhauser, 2000), thus leading to the breakdown of the social
order, as is also suggested by Lynch (2003) and de Swaan (1988). This
tension between glorifying oneself in this world, by consumingmore than
one’s peers (more than µ) and providing for the next by higher donations
relative to one’s income, appears a constant in the human condition.
In contrast to religious activity, individual spirituality responds to char-
itable giving relative to one’s income, rather than absolute amounts of
donations. And this difference yields some additional insights about in-
dividual wellbeing and the religious community.
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Proposition 7 In the religious equilibrium, an increase in the financial
resources available to the individual, yields greater relative donations by
members and results in higher levels of spirituality and over-all wellbeing.
That is,
d
dM
d
∗
> 0;
d
dM
σ > 0;
d
dM
u > 0.
As income rises, so do donations to the church, the more one has to
share, the more one shares. Further, the higher the wealth of the church,
D, all else equal, and thus the better able the church is to fulfill its pas-
toral missions, the better off the members of the church—and the more,
again, members are willing to give, resulting from further multiplier ef-
fects.
However, the source of those funds does matter. So suppose, as in
many European countries, individuals’ incomes are taxed, reducing M ,
and those tax revenues are used to fund churches. Suppose prior to the
imposition of the tax the wealth of the church is Dˆ, and the government
agrees to maintain this level of funding after the tax and the government
further agrees that it will tax no more than is needed to maintain Dˆ.
Then, because individuals’ income has fallen, they will reduce their do-
nations, taxes will have to be increased to compensate, and this process
can continue until the entire funding of the church is provided by the
state: D = dS . Even though the wealth of the church is maintained,
members of the faith community are made worse off: their own spiritu-
ality and their personal happiness are unambiguously diminished. This
mirrors Andreoni (1990), but here it is not the warm glow of giving that
is lost but one’s personal investment in faith and one’s attachment to
one’s faith community.
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5 The Role of an Effective Church
As stated at the outset, the church, compared to the state, is well-placed
to provide a coordinating function, which may assure the attainment
of the Pareto-superior equilibrium. It does so by providing incentives.6
These incentives can be positive (rewards)—the eschatological benefits of
the Kingdom of God. And negative (punishments)—consider, e.g., Matt
13:40–42 or Mark 8:38.
Also, the church institutes rituals, communal gatherings for prayer
and reflection in which beliefs held in common are reiterated, and, for
Christians, in the reaffirmation of their oneness with Christ. That is, the
church reminds its members that they have obligations to their fellow
men and in considering themselves they must consider all others as well,
since they together, form the church, which, divided against itself (when
coordination fails) cannot stand. In practical (coordinating) terms the
church can make its members aware that their actions affect others, even
others they do not know and who do not know them.
However, to the extent that church leaders are able to coordinate com-
munity actions, they may even be able to induce individuals to behave
specifically as amember of the community, and thus in a socially optimal,
rather than in an individually optimal, manner. In so doing, the church
can cause agents to each act for the greater good, i.e., as ‘social planners,’
and thereby lead the community to a Pareto optimal outcome—the best
outcome for all agents individually as well as communally.7
Theorem (Pareto-Optimality) Pareto-optimality is achieved—and thus over-
all societal and individual wellbeing are maximized—at levels of religious
6Brams and Kilgour (2002) find that a certain day of reckoning, no matter how far
in the future, induces good behavior today. Hull and Bold (1989) consider the escha-
tological rewards and punishments as enforcement mechanisms. We consider them,
instead, as incentives for and indicators of ideal behavior.
7Guiso, et al. (2003) show that Christians exhibit behaviors conducive to economic
growth, a macroeconomic indicator of welfare. Our results suggest why theirs may
obtain.
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activity and donations that exceed the (decentralized) individual optimal
levels of the Pareto-superior religious equilibrium. That is,
u
(
·, σ
(
r∗∗, d∗∗
))
> u
(
·, σ
(
r∗, d∗
))
,
with r∗∗ > r∗, and d∗∗ > d∗,
where r∗∗ and d∗∗ are the individual levels of religious activity and do-
nations that maximize
(l− λ)α(m− µ)βh(1+ r)γT(χ(r ,Md))
(
1+ d
)γM(χ(r ,Md))
The church’s prescribed solution suggests that all members of the
community should engage in a level of religious activity and donations
in excess of the individually optimal level (i.e., r∗∗ > r∗ and d∗∗ > d∗),
because of the positive external effects of their actions on others (see
the multipliers in Lemma 2 and the supporting discussion). The church
then exhorts its members to this level of activity by revealing the positive
effects of individuals’ actions one on the other, thereby revealing what in
the market would remain hidden. Whenever the church is able to do this,
Pareto optimality can be achieved. That is, while individuals would like
to alter their behavior, given what others are doing in the Pareto-optimal
state (i.e., rbri (r
∗∗
−i ) < r
∗∗ and dbri (d
∗∗
−i ) < d
∗∗
), they recognize that
the overall effect of individual best-responses (Corollary ??), is strictly
dominated by following church recommendations.
The church can obtain this outcome through moral suasion, or it
can resort to a formalization of the h-function discussed earlier, i.e.,
rmin(ρ) = r∗∗ and dmin(ρ) = d∗∗. Although this threat of hell is coer-
cive, all agree that the prescribed behavior is optimal, and would readily
agree to the coercion. Thus, concerning donations, e.g., in the Old Testa-
ment individuals are commanded to tithe, since one tenth of their wealth
is the Lord’s portion:
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“When you have finished paying all the tithe of your produce
in the third year, which is the year of tithing, giving it to the
Levite, the sojourner, the fatherless, and the widow, that they
may eat within your towns and be filled.” [Deut 26:12]
And in the New Testament individuals are commanded to give to God
what is God’s:
Jesus said to them, “Render to Caesar the things that are Cae-
sar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” [Mark 12:17a]
These specific recommendations can be thought of as providing a level of
donations great enough to insure against the coordination failure equi-
librium outcome. But they may be more than that, and rather set a level
of donations, explicitly or implicitly, that will lead to the Pareto optimal
coordinated outcome.
The great potential of the Church, compared to the State, in modern
Western societies, thus becomes clear, for it is incompatible with mod-
ern views of a free society that individuals be forced to the degree pos-
sibly required to achieve the Pareto efficient outcome (especially when it
comes to one’s time) by means of the force of the State. Yet, rather than
the State’s force, the Church’s power to use coercion is voluntary and
acceptable. Yet, herein also lies the challenge to the Church in Western
(increasingly secular) societies, for it is easier for the individual to free-
ride within or even leave the Church than it is for him free-ride in or to
leave the State.
6 Conclusion
The church has played a central role in establishing and maintaining,
as well as, perhaps inadvertently, undermining, communities through-
out modern history. Yet today it finds itself often on the periphery, less
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able to build communities of faith and to minister to the wider commu-
nity. In this paper we explore some of the mechanisms through which
churches can coordinate individual behavior so as to achieve improve-
ments in individual and social welfare, and in so doing reveal the ways
in which churches can fail, causing established communities to founder
or dissolve.
In ourmodel of community formation inherently religious individuals
may become trapped in a secular equilibrium because no one else prac-
tices, or because what is offered by a church is less than what is offered by
secular society because of the weakness or incoherence of church teach-
ings, poverty, or lack of adherents. These secular equilibria are strictly
dominated by a religious equilibrium in which individuals’ actions be-
stow positive external benefits on other community members. Churches
reveal the benefits of coordinated behavior, both in this world and in
the world to come, and the costs of uncoordinated behavior, separation
from God and one’s fellow man, to induce community members to take
actions which are both individually and socially (communally) beneficial.
The power of the church’s exhortations is diminished by doctrinal
weakness, which can have its source in the doctrine itself, how that
doctrine is interpreted, applied, or perceived, or how that doctrine is
communicated. The rapid growth of the so called Evangelical Christian
(Protestant) Churches in the United States, and the decline of the so called
Mainline Protestant Churches have been attributed to doctrinal strength
in the former and weakness in the latter. The decline in religious practice
in Europe may be attributed to issues of doctrine and to the ceding to
or crowding out by the State what had once been the provenance of the
Church, such as the provision of charity for the poor, and other social-
welfare programs for the community at large. Additionally, funding of
the Church by the State, as is found in many European countries, can
erode the benefits of membership in one’s faith community, and, per-
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haps, lead to the dissolution of the community (reversion to the secular
equilibrium).
Churches have proven themselves to be very resilient institutions
which can play a vital role in strengthening communities. Whether they
can continue to do so depends on what they can offer to those strug-
gling to meet the demands of this world, in a world in which many of
their traditional ministries have been ceded to the State, and in a world
in which their teachings are often perceived to be at variance with rather
than the source of shared cultural beliefs. The challenge to churches to-
day is great, but the benefit to society of their succeeding may be greater
still.
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religious activities (thick dashed line) as a function of other 
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Given the time constraint (??), the agent engages in
religious activity only if the marginal utility from doing so is greater than
or equal to the marginal utility from leisure time. 
Proof of Proposition ?? Assumption 2 implies that γtα
l−λ
1+r
∣∣∣
χ=o < 1, or
γT (0) < α
1+ r
l− λ , ∀r , l. (9)
By Assumption 1, γT is strictly increasing and therefore has a strictly
increasing inverse, call this γ−1T . It follows from Equation ?? that 0 <
γ−1T
(
α1+rl−λ
)
. Moreover, since γ−1T is increasing, we have
γ−1T
(
α
1+ r
1− λ− r
)
> 0 (10)
Let R and D be given and define r = R/n as the average contribution
necessary to obtain R. Now let
ρ|R,D =
⎛
⎝γ−1T
(
α 1+r1−λ−r
)
Rκ1Dκ2
⎞
⎠
1/κ3
, (11)
and note by Equation ?? that ρ > 0. Note finally that for all ρ′ < ρ,
Equation ?? can be rewritten as
γT
(
R,D,ρ′
)
(1− λ)−α
α+ γT
(
R,D,ρ′
) < r,
which, by Equation ??, indicates that the agents’ chosen time in religious
activities is insufficient to sustain R given ρ′ so that no religious equilib-
rium exists for any ρ < ρ, given R and D. 
Proof of Corollary ?? The unique equilibrium at ρ = ρ follows directly
from the proof of the proposition. The remainder is the standard proof
for coordination games. See, e.g., Cooper (1999). 
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Proof of Lemma 2 Noting that for all r−i < r˜−i the best individual re-
sponse is rbri = 0, we obtain the equality of the lemma. The inequality
follows from extending Equation ?? to the rest of the domain. 
Proof of Proposition ??
1. Rewriting Equation ?? gives the implicit equilibrium condition as,
G(r∗, ·) = γT
(
(nr∗)κ1 Dκ2ρκ3
)
(1− λ)−α
α+ γT
(
(nr∗)κ1 Dκ2ρκ3
) − r∗ = 0. (12)
Hence, recalling that χ = (nr∗)κ1 Dκ2ρκ3 ,
d
dn
r∗ = − Gn
Gr∗
=
γ′T κ1χα(2−λ)
n(α+γT )2
1− γ′T κ1χα(2−λ)
r∗(α+γT )2
> 0,
where the inequality follows, because at the stable Pareto-dominant
equilibrium, the slope of the derivative of the best-response func-
tion (See Equation ??) is less than 1, making the denominator posi-
tive.
2. The agent’s spirituality σ is increasing in the number of active con-
gregants n, because σ is increasing in both γT (which is increasing
in n—see Assumption 1 in conjunction with Equation ?? and the
definition of R), and in r∗i , which was just shown to be increasing
in n.
3. Due to multiplier effects (Lemma 2), an exogenous increase in χ
due to an increase in n increases the agent’s utility at his initial
choice of ri. His utility is then further increased by re-optimizing
his religious activity.

Proof of Proposition ?? Using Equation ??, similar to the proof of
Proposition ?? one has,
sign
(
d
dρ
r∗
)
= sign (Gρ) = sign
(
γ′Tκ3χα(2− λ)
ρ (α+ γT )2
)
> 0.
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The other arguments follow as in the proof to Proposition ?? 
Proof of Proposition ?? The proof follows mutatis mutandis from the
proofs of Propositions ?? and ??. 
Proof of Proposition ?? Similar to the previous proofs,
sign
(
d
dλ
r∗
)
= sign (Gλ) = sign
(
−γT
α+ γT
)
< 0.

Proof of Proposition ?? The proof follows along the lines of the proof
to Proposition ?? 
Proof of Proposition ?? The proof is analogous to those of Propositions
?? and ??. 
Proof of Theorem The proof is an implication of multiplier effects and
follows readily. 
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